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the present plaintiff is concerned. The vice-president in this par-
ticular case brought in from the outside certain of the stolen bonds
and attached them to this draft. The defendant bank did not own
these bonds or really undertake to sell them. The vice-president
was not really acting for the bank in the matter. He took advan-
tage of his' position, and the opportunities it afforded, to make a
purely personal act appear as the act of the bank. If anyone had
been misled by this appearance a suitable remedy could be had, but
it is difficult to see how it harmed the plaintiff any more than the
other transactions.
2
A petition for certiorari was dismissed by the Supreme Court.
The most recent case in the Supreme Court of the United States
is Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. United States,3 which charged
the principal with the knowledge of the agent through whom the
benefits in question were acquired.4
FLOYD R. MECHEm.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-SEPARATION OF POWERi-PbwER OF
PRESIDENT TO PARDON CRIMINAL CONTEPT.-The case of United
States v. Grossman,' decided May 15, considers at large the mooted
question of the power of an American executive to pardon a crim-
inal contempt committed against a court of general jurisdiction.
The precise point at issue was, of course, the power of the Presi-
dent, but, in the absence of controlling special provisions of state
constitutions, the same considerations seem applicable to the power
of a governor, and this was assumed by Judge Carpenter who wrote
the opinion (Wilkerson, J., concurring). On a bill filed by the
United States an order authorized by the Volstead Act had been
issued by the court, temporarily restraining the defendant from
selling liquor in violation of the act. For disobedience of this order
the defendant was found guilty of contempt, fined $1,000, and
ordered imprisoned for a year. The President having pardoned the
imprisonment, the court denied that he had this power.
Judge Carpenter's opinion is strong and elaborate. Its out-
line is as follows: The power expressly given to the President by
the, ConstitutionL--"to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses
against the United States, except in cases of impeachment"-is con-
fined to offenses declared to be such by Congress. Offenses against
the federal courts, punishable ,as contempts (even though classified
as "criminal" contempt as contrasted with "civil" contempt whose
2. Cases cited from the state courts, upon the "sole actor" rule, were
Cook v. American Tubing Co. 28 R. I. 41, 65 Atl. 641, 9 L. R. A. (N. s.) 193;
First Nat. Bank v. Burns 88 Ohio St. 434, 103 N. E. 93, 49 L. R. A. (N. s.)
764; Smith v. Mercantile Bank 132 Tenn. 147, 177 S. W. 72; Tatumo v. Comt-
mercial Bank 193 Ala. 69 So. 508, L. R. A. 1916C, 767.
3. 262 U. S. 215, 43 Sup. Ct. 570.
4. There is elaborate discussion in the opinion and notes in Brookhouse
v. Union Publishing Co. 73 N. H. 368, 62 Atl. 219, 2 L. P. A. (N. s.) 993,
111 Am. St. R. 623, 6 Ann. Cas. 675.
1. (N. D. Ill. E. Div. 1924) ... Fed. ....
2. (Art. II See. 2.)
COMMENT ON RECENT CASES
purpose is remedial for litigants), are not offenses against the United
States within the meaning of any of the constitutional provisions
concerning methods of punishing crime, and, under the doctrine of
separation of powers, cannot be held to be included within the
pardoning power of the President. Contempts against the legis-
lature, for instance, could not be pardoned by the executive, as
this would tend to deprive the legislature of effective power to dis-
charge its duties when interfered with by offenders.3 Similarly the
punishment of contempts against the courts cannot be interfered
with by the executive without jeopardizing the independence of
the judiciary in securing obedience to and respect for their pro-
ceedings. Various opinions of the attorney general upholding the
presidential power to pardon contempt4 are held erroneous, and sev-
eral state decisions supporting a similar gubernatorial power are also
distinguished or condemned.5 Against the power to pardon afe
cited Taylor v. Goodrich,6 and strong, fully reasoned dicta in
Re Nez'itt,7 and State v. Verage.3 From the two later cases exten-
sive quotations -are made with approval, and their reasoning is in
the main adopted by Judge Carpenter, especially that of the Wis-
consin case that the power to pardon properly extends only to
offenses against laws which the pardoning power has a duty to
execute. The executive has a duty to prevent ordinary crime ("to
see that the laws be executed") and so may pardon it; but be owes
no duty to administer justice, to keep order in the court room, to
compel the attendance of witnesses and jurors, or to enforce obedi-
ence to orders of the court. The courts alone are charged with
these, they alone declare in contempt persons who interfere with
these duties, and alone should be allowed to remit the punishment
for such contempts.
It is expected that this decision will be reviewed by the Supreme
Court in habeas corpus proceedings at the October term, 1924. It
may not be improper, meanwhile, to suggest some reasons for differ-
ing with the view of the lower court. Whatever weight may be
given to historical and technical arguments, the strongest objection
to the pardoning power of the executive must be one of policy-
that it tends to deprive the courts of a power needed to protect their
work and preserve their prestige, and so should be denied to the
executive within the American doctrine of separation of powers.
Obviously the strength of this argument depends upon the purposes
sought by contempt proceedings. These may be of at least three
classes: (1) To secure private rights in litigation. (2) To protect
the courts in the process of adjudication. (3) To assist in the
administration of public law, criminal or administrative.
3. Quoting the argument to this effect in Stor-y "Comm. on Const." (5th
ed.) II sec. 1503.
4. (1841) 3 Op. Atty. Gen. 622; (1845) 4 ibid. 458; (1852) 5 ibid. 579.
5. See Sharp v. State (1899) 102 Tenn. 9; Ex parte Hickey (Miss. 1845)
4 Sm. & Marsh. 751; State v. Sauvinet (1872) 24 La. Ann. 119.
6. (1897) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 109.
7. (8th C. A. 1902) 117 Fed. 448.
8. (1922) 177 Wis. 295.
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Class 1-to secure private rights in litigation-includes (a)
so-called civil contempt, where the coercion is remedial and the
defendant may at any time purge himself by obedience, as well as(b) that branch of criminal contempt where the court punishes dis-
obedience of a remedial order, when the defendant is unable to
restore the status quo ante. The executive, of course, may not
pardon 'civil contempt for the same reason that he may not interfere
with other rernedial processes of courts-it is an interference withprivate rights and remedies outside of his jurisdiction as a public
executive. A non-purgeable punitive order for disobedience of a
remedial order stands on a somewhat different footing. Its execu-
tion benefits a private plaintiff only indirectly as an" example to
deter future disobedience of remedial orders, and it may be argued
that in part, at least, it is designed to vindicate the public authority
of the court. The principal case would hold it not pardonable by
the executive for this reason. Mr. Justice Blatchford of the Fed-
eral Supreme Court, on circuit, held otherwise in Re ilullee--not
cited by Judge Carpenter; and the same was held in State v.
Sauvinet.10
Class 2-to protect the courts in the process of adjudication-
is the one for which the most appealing arguments may be made
against the executive pard6ning power. Unless courts can keep
order in or about their places of sitting, command sufficient public
respect to assure fair hearings, compel the attendance of witnesses
and jurors, and require from parties, witnesses, attorneys, and court
officers generally the performance of those duties appropriate to
the conduct of litigation, they lack the power of self-preservation
advanced by Chief Justice White in Marshall v. Gordon"l as the
real basis of the "inherent" power to commit for contempt. The
reasons for denying the executive power to pardon contempts of
this character seem as persuasive as those given by Story, supra,
against pardoning legislative contempts, and it may well be that the
executive power does not extend to this class of contempts. Taylor
v. Goodrich'2 -where the power to pardon was denied-was of this
character. Ex parte Hickey,"3 contra, semble, is distinguishable.
Class 3-t6 assist in the administration of public law, criminal
or administrative-is the one to which the Grossman case belongs.
The considerations involved here are wholly different from those
in classes 1 and 2. An act that is criminal is forbidden by a court
order obtained under public authority, and disobedience is punished
as contempt. This may be done in a limited class of cases without a
statute-e. g., public nuisances; and more widely by statute-e. g.,
Eilenbecker v. Plymouth County 4 (Iowa liquor law enforcement);
9. (1869) 7 Blatch. 23.
10. (1872) 24 La. Ann. 119.
11. (1917) 243 U. S. 521, 541-43.
12. (1897) 25 Tex. Civ. App. 109.
13. (Miss. 1845) 4 Sm. & Marsh. 751.
14. (1890) 134 U. S. 31.
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Sherman Anti-Trust Act,1 5 Clayton Act,1 6 Volstead Act. 7 Or,
without criminal sanctions, certain conduct, being required in a pub-
lic administrative proceeding, may by statute be demanded through
a court order, positive or negative, and disobedience punished as
contempt-e. g., Interstate Contmerce Comm. v Brimson'8 ; and sim-
ilar acts f6r the benefit of many recent federal boards and com-
missions-e. g., Federal Reserve Board and Trade Commission,' 9
Tariff Commission,20 Railway Labor Board,21 Federal Power Com-
mission.
22
In the criminal cases the help of the court is invoked solely
to secure a more speedy or effective administratiofi of the criminal
law, injunctions are issued against acts that are crimes and punish-
able as such, and their violation is punished, not primarily to vindi-
cate the authority of the court nor to protect its processes of
adjudication, but to deter the repetition of conduct that the legis-
lative policy of the state has declared criminal. The reasons of
policy that support executive pardons for crimes are as applicable to
their punishment by contempt procedings as to their punishment
by ordinary criminal proceedings, whenever the purpose of, the
former is solely or primarily to secure the better enforcement of
the criminal law. This is the avowed object of the equitable en-
forcement provisions of the Volstead Act, copied in policy and sub-
stance from various state prohibition acts in force for a generation
or more; and, without denying the force of Judge Carpenter's argu-
ment against executive pardons for contempts of class 2 above, and
possibly those of class 1, (b), it seems that at least the criminal
enforcement contempts of class 3 might rationally and properly be
distinguished. A violation of an injunction issued to prevent crime,
as such, is no more necessarily a flouting of the authority of the
court that issues it than of the legislature that has also forbidden it,
nor is the sole control of the punishment for it in any fair sense
necessary to preserve the court as an effective instrument of adjudi-
cation.
Our theory of the executive pardoning power is, in part, that
there may exist reasons for remitting the punishment of crime that
judges, administering somewhat precise and rigid rules, may not be
at liberty freely to consider; and that the executive may give effect
to public opinion in regard to the punishment of certain offenses
in a way that would be improper in a judge. These reasons may
be as potent when crime is punished by an equity judge in contempt
proceedings as when it is punished by a common law judge after
conviction by a jury. That the executive should be able to pardon
both seems logically consistent and socially desirable, nor does it
15. (1890) 26 St. L. 209, see. 4.
16. (1914) 38 St. L. 736-38, secs. 15-19.
17. (1919) 41 St. L. 306, 314, secs. 4, 22, 23.
18. (1894) -155 U. S. 3.
19. (1914) 38 St. L. 734-5, sec. 11.
20. (1916) 39 St. L. 797, sec. 706.
21. (1920) 41 St. L. 472, see. 310b.
22. (1923) 42 St. L. 1448, sec. 3.
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seem any greater blow to the just prestige of a court that the execu-
tive should pardon a defendant's commitment for contempt than
that he should remit his sentence for crime-both being imposed
for the same criminal act, and perhaps by the same judge sitting
first in an equity and then in a criminal term of the court.
It remains to be added that, if the executive cannot pardon
criminal contempt, it is by no means certain that anyone else can,
which would be a grave inconvenience. The Grossman decision
probably assumes that the court punishing contempt may withdraw
or alter its order at any time, under the general continuing power of
a court of equity to control and modify its decrees. This may be
so-it is to be hoped that it is, if the present decision be sound-
but there are some decisions, federal and state, denying thlat a court
can alter a judgment or penalty for criminal contempt after the
term of court when imposed, likening it in this respect to an ordinary
criminal judgment.23 These decisions, if correct, strengthen the
impression of the validity of the Grossman pardon.
JAmES PARKER HALL.-
ILLINOIS CASES
CON-LICTF OF LAwS-VALIDITY OF CONTRACT-UsuRy.-In
George v. Haas' the court decided that a promissory note payable
in another country, signed and deposited for transmission in the
mails in this state, even if it was to be deemed to be a contract com-
pleted in this -state, was controlled with respect to usury, by the
laws of the place of payment, according to which the contract was
not usurious, though under Ilinois law it would be usurious. With
the result reached it would be difficult to disagree. But some of
the language of the opinion seems to conflict with prior pronounce-
ments of the court Thus in the case of Burr v. Beckler2 holding
that a note payable in Illinois executed by a wife while temporarily
in Florida, and void by the laws of that state for want of capacity,
was void, the court said: "It is a universal rule of law that the
validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the place
where made, and if it is not valid there it will not be enforced in
another state in which it would have been valid if made there."
In -the instant case the court says: "If a contract is executed in
one state, to be performed in another state or country, the law of
the place where the contract is to be performed will determine its
validity and the nature and extent of the obligation." These two
utterances (both by the same judge) appear to be mutually con-
tradictory. The earlier case is not referred to in the later one.
Both cases, to a considerable extent, cite the same authorities.
These two conflicting statements of the law present another and
striking illustration of the confusion prevailing as to the law ap-
23. Fischer v. Hayes (1881) 6 Fed. 63, by Blatchford, J.; State v. Meyer(1912) 86 Kan. 793.
1. 311 Iil. 382.
2. 264 Ill. 230.
